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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant J. Pochynok
Co. will be referred to herein as "Pochynok" and the appellees Gregory and LouAnn
Smedsrud will be referred to herein as the "Smedsruds".
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.)
ISSUE ON APPEAL:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD
ENOUGH INFORMATION TO PROPERLY DETERMINE THE
"SUCCESSFUL PARTY" IN THIS CASE FOR PURPOSES OF
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES BASED UPON THE JURY VERDICT
THAT WAS RENDERED IN THIS MATTER?
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: When a trial court's rulings are based
upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have
produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error
rectified in a proper adjudication under a correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery, 616
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v.
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912). Wliether and the extent to which attorney
fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
Selvage v. J.J Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996).
Presentation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs And Attorney Fees (R. 387-389);
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs And Attorneys'
Fees (R. 435-459); Plaintiffs Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 469470); Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Motion For Award Of Attorney's
Fees And Costs And In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Tax Costs And Attorney's
Fees (R. 572-592); Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs
And Attorneys Fees (R. 544-554); Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For
Award Of Attorneys' Fees And Costs (R. 567-571); Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In
Support Of Plaintiff s Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 598-609);
Minute Entry Ruling (R. 621-622); Judgment Upon Verdict And Order On Post Trial
Motions (R. 635-640); Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 650-651);
Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 652666); Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment
(R. 667-686); Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To
Amend Judgment (R. 706-718); Minute Entry Ruling (R. 726-727); Order Denying
Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 729-731); Appellant's briefing in the Utah Court Of
Appeals (Case No. 20020940-CA); Appellant's briefing in the Utah Supreme Court (Case
No. 20040005-SC); Remittitur From Utah Supreme Court (R. 892-903); Remittitur Order On Remand (R. 904-905); Pochynok's Request For New Jury Trial And
Submission Of Form Of Special Verdict To Jury (R. 954-973); Pochynok's Submission
Of Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law (R. 974-975); and Smedsmds'
Findings Of fact And Conclusions Of Law Re: Costs And Attorneys Fees (R. 984-992).
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ISSUE ON APPEAL:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
WHEN IT FAILED TO SET ASIDE THE GARNISHMENT OF
POCHYNOK'S ACCOUNT AND FAILED TO RESINSTATE
POCHYNOK'S MECHANIC'S LIEN?

Applicable Standard of Appellate Review:

When a trial court's rulings are based

upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have
produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error
rectified in a proper adjudication under a correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery, 616
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v.
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912).
Preservation of Issue: The above-stated issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: Pochynok's Motion To Set Aside Garnishment, For Restitution, And To
Reinstate Mechanic's Lien (R. 908-912); Memorandum In Support Of Pochynok's
Motion To Set Aside Garnishment, For Restitution, And To Reinstate Mechanic's Lien
(R. 908-912); Memorandum In Opposition To Pochynok's Motion To Set Aside
Garnishment For Restitution And To Reinstate Mechanic's Lien (R. 913-936); Reply
Memorandum In support Of Pochynok's Motion To Set Aside Garnishment, for
Restitution, And To Reinstate Mechanic's Lien; Minute Entry Ruling (R. 944-945);
Minute Entry (R. 946-949); and Minutes Law And Motion (R. 950).
STATUTES WHICH ARE OF DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE ON THE APPEAL
Code Annotated § 38-1-18. Attorneys1 fees — Offer of judgment
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs
in the action.
Utah
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(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not
entitled to recover attorneys' fees under Subsection (1).
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter
may make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the
offeror after the offer was made.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below
Pochynok, a general contractor, brought suit against the Smedsruds seeking to
recover damages for breach of a construction contract and to foreclose its mechanic's
lien. The Smedsruds asserted a counterclaim also seeking damages for breach of the
construction contract. At trial, the jury found in favor of Pochynok awarding $7,076.56.
There was no award entered on the jury verdict form in favor of the Smedsruds.
Pochynok and the Smedsruds each filed post trial motions asserting that they were
the successful party at trial and sought costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 31-1-18. The Smedsruds argued that they were entitled to their attorney fees
because they were the "successful party" in the litigation in accordance with § 38-118(1). Contrary to the Smedsruds position, Pochynok argued that as the only party to be
awarded by the jury, Pochynok was in fact the "successful party" in the litigation, and
therefore entitled to its attorney fees under § 31-1-18(1). The trial court raled that the
Smedsruds were the prevailing party and therefore entitled to recover all of their costs
and attorney fees. The Smedsruds subsequently garnished $37,585.00 from Pochynok
Company's bank account. Despite Pochynok's objections, the trial court upheld the
garnishment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This case was then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals in 2002. Pochynok v.
Smedsrud, 80 P.3d 563, 486 Utah Adv. Rep 27, 2003 UT App 375 (Ut. Ct. App. 2003).
On appeal, Pochynok argued that it was entitled to costs and fees incurred in the action
because it was the only party that received an award from the jury. Pochynok also
contested the appropriateness of the garnishment. The Smedsruds argued that the trial
court should have evaluated the successful party determination using a "flexible and
reasoned" approach and further contended that the garnishment was appropriate. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings in all respects.
Pochynok thereafter petitioned to the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ Of
Certiorari. The Utah Supreme Court granted the petition and heard the case. Pochynok v.
Smedsrud, 116 P.3d 353, 528 Utah Adv. Rep 34, 2005 UT 39 (Utah 2004). The Utah
Supreme Court expressed approval for the use of the "flexible and reasoned" approach,
but reversed the Court of Appeals decision and directed the appellate court "to remand to
the trial court for a factual determination of awards and offsets, followed by a ruling on
who is the successful party under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and whether an award of
attorneys fees under Utah Code section 38-1-18(3) is proper." Upon remand the attorney
fees award was vacated pending the trial court's determination.
After remand and the setting aside of the attorney fees award, Pochynok sought to
have the money that had been fomierly garnished from its account returned. Pochynok
farther requested that the trial court reinstate its mechanic's lien. These issues were
briefed and submitted to the trial court. Following oral argument the trial court declined
to reinstate the mechanic's lien and took the garnishment issue under advisement. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ti ial 1:1 ten directed tl le pai ties to si ibi i lit. pi oposed Hi id.iii.gs: a.i id coiiicJusion in .1 elatioi 1 to
the attorney fees issue.
Pochynok thereafter filed a motion for new trial along with its proposed findings
and conclusioi is. Both tl le n lotioi 1 f 01 i ie w I:i ial ai id pi ( iposed findii lgs and conch isions
averred that a new trial was warranted because the trial court did not have the information
necessary from the jury to utilize the Utah Supreme Court, mandated flexible and
reasoned approach.
The Smedsi uds filed tliei..! proposed findings and conch isions a few days latei Oi 1
the same day the Sinedsruds proposed finding and conclusions were filed, the trial court
issued a minuie entry uhich adopted the Smedsruds' proposal as the findings and
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determined that the Smedsruds were the successful party in the iiiigauoii ana were
therefore entitled to all of (heir costs and fees. Pochynok appealed from the trial court's
signed minute entry.
:S * IT.MF^ V « x\ - ^ I N
1.

m this action, Pochynok brought a bleach of construction contract claim

against the Smedsruds and sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien on real property owned

substantial damages for breach of the same construction contract, winch damages
included unearned supervisor fees, workmanship defects and delay damages. (R 19-29;

I 'lie in.x liter was presented to \ t jury on IVk \:y 21 i ind 22, 2002 (R 249-250)
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3.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of

Pochynok Company in the amount of $7,076.56. (R. 354-355) The "general" jury verdict
form read as follows:
1. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor
of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory
and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7,076.56.
2. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor
of defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J.
Pochynok Company, Inc., in the amount of $
.
4.

Pochynok and the Smedsruds each filed post-trial motions requesting

attorneys fees on the basis that each respective party was the "successful party" in the
lien foreclosure action pursuant to § 3 8-1 -18 (1).
5.

Notwithstanding the fact that jury returned a verdict in favor of Pochynok

and against the Smedsruds, the trial court ruled in favor of the Smedsruds, finding that
the Smedsruds were the successful party and therefore entitled to recover their costs and
fees. (R. 621-622 and 726-727)
6.

Judgment was entered in favor of the Smedsruds on August 13, 2002. (R.

635-640)
7.

On September 12, 2002, funds in a Pochynok Company bank account were

garnished by the Smedsruds in the amount of $37,585.00, and the garnishment was
upheld by the trial court over Pochynok's objection. (R. 703-705, 728 and 849-851)
8.

Pochynok Company sought appellate review of the trial court's

determination that the Smedsruds were the successful party in the litigation. (R. 816817)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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9.

In affirming the trial court's successful party determination, the Utah Court

of Appeals stated as follows:
Here, the jury's verdict form does not provide precise calculations of
offsets the jury may have made for the Smedsruds' counterclaims for faulty
workmanship, delay damages, and improper supervision. However, from
the verdict, the trial court could have reasonable inferred such offsets by
simply subtracting the jury's verdict of $7,076.56 from the $81,269.91 that
Pochynok sought to recover in the lien enforcement action. The trial court
could have reasonably concluded that the jury in fact found in favor of the
Smedsruds on their counterclaims and offset these damages in the amount
of $74,193.35 from Pochynok's initial claim, (emphasis added)
10.

After receiving the Court of Appeals' decision, Pochynok filed a Petition

For Writ Of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court.
11.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Court of Appeals

decision and directed the appellate court "to remand to the trial court for a factual
determination of awards and offsets, followed by a ruling on who is the successful party
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and whether an award of attorneys fees under Utah
Code section 38-1-18(3) is proper."
12.

Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's decision, the attorney fees award in

this case was vacated until the trial court made a determination of awards and offsets.
13.

After the case returned to the trial court, Pochynok filed a motion to have

the garnished money returned and for reinstatement of it's mechanic's lien. (R. 906-940)
14.

The trial court denied reinstatement of the mechanic's lien, and took the

garnishment issue under advisement. The trial court also directed that the parties file
proposed findings and conclusions in relation to the successful party/attorney fees issue.
(R. 946-950)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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15.

Pochynok then filed a request for a new trial, along with its proposed

findings and conclusions. (R. 951-977)
16.

A short time thereafter, the Smedsmds filed their proposed findings and

conclusions. On the same day as their filing, the trial court entered the proposed findings
and conclusions as the trial court's findings and conclusions.
17.

Pochynok thereafter appealed the signed minute entry order in which the

trial court adopted the Smedruds' proposed findings and conclusions as it own.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court in this case did not have enough information from the jury to
determine the successful party at trial for purposes of awarding costs and attorney fees.
The trial court engaged in impermissible speculation in order to reach its findings and
conclusions. As such, a new trial should be granted so a proper award of costs and
attorney fees can be determined.
The trial court erred when it failed to return the proceeds which had been
garnished from Pochynok's account, and further erred when if failed to reinstate
Pochynok's mechanic's lien. After the Utah Supreme Court vacated the attorney fees
award in this case, there was no valid legal basis for the Smedsmds to retain the
f

garnished money.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD ENOUGH INFORMATION TO PROPERLY
DETERMINE THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" IN THIS CASE FOR PURPOSES OF
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
o contain errors.

AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES BASED UPON THE JURY VERDICT THAT WAS
RENDERED IN THIS MATTER?
The trial court in this matter did not have enough information from the jury to
utilize the flexible and reasoned approach mandated by the Utah Supreme Court. The
jury verdict form completed by the jury only provided for an award in favor of Pochynok
and not for any award in favor of Smedsrud. The jury's May 22, 2002 Jury Verdict
stated as follows:
1. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of
plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory and
LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7,076.56.
2. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of
defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J.
Pochynok Company, Inc., in the amount of $
.
The jury thus found Pochynok entitled to recover $7,076.56 from the Smedsmds. No
amount was inserted in the blank providing for any award in favor of the Smedsmds.
Following trial, Pochynok and the Smedsmds each claimed attorney fees under
Section 38-1-18 of Utah mechanic's lien law. Subsection (1) of Section 38-1-18 provides
"the successful

party" shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees.

Notwithstanding that the jury awarded $7,076.56 to Pochynok, and made no express
award to the Smedsmds, the trial court ruled the Smedsmds the successful party for
pmposes of awarding attorney fees and did in fact award the Smedsmds' costs and
attorneys fees against Pochynok in the amount of $84,036.54.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals found the trial court properly determined the
Smedsmds were the successful party, and noted the jury's verdict did not show whatever
offsets the jury might have applied as to the Smedsmds' counterclaims.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The appellate

court then stated the trial court could have inferred that the jury awarded the Smedsruds
$74,193.35 in offsets and on that basis may have concluded the Smedsruds were the
successful party.
The June 24, 2005 decision of the Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court's decision notes that Pochynok filed a

mechanic's lien for approximately $74,000.00 and that Pochynok had asserted a claim at
trial for $81,269.91 not including costs or attorneys fees. The Supreme Court further
noted that the Smedsruds claimed an unspecified amount of offsets and damages,
claiming unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays.
The Supreme Court's decision stated that the jury awarded Pochynok a verdict of
$7,076.56 giving no indication of whether or by how much the jury may have offset the
claims made by the Smedsruds against any larger Pochynok entitlement which might
have entered into the juiy's deliberations.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court should have first determined who was
the "successful party" under subsection (1) of Section 38-1-18. The Supreme Court
decision cites A.K. & R. Wliipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 94 P.3d 270
(Utah 2004), a mechanic's lien case in which counterclaims were made although one
party received a small recovery. Whipple held the trial court properly determined there
was no "successful party", only essentially a draw and was justified in not awarding
attorney fees. The Supreme Court stated that the Whipple decision means that rigid
application of the net judgment rale could result in unreasonable awards of attorneys fees
and deprive a trial court of power to apply discretion and common sense and said that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,11
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"flexible and reasoned approach" outlined in Whipple and in Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) "requires more
information about the jury award for the parties' particular claims than is available in this
case."
The Supreme Court further said that "because the jury's verdict did not indicate
specific awards and offsets, the trial court did not have the infomiation necessary to
undertake such a balancing" (of amounts sought vs. what was recovered) and in its final
conclusion said that "we conclude that the trial court could not have made this (successful
party) determination without specific infomiation regarding the total amount the jury
awarded to Pochynok and the total amount in offsets it awarded to the Smedsruds."
The aforementioned statement presumes, without support from the record, that the
jury made entitlement findings for both sides and then offset them to amve at a net award
in favor of Pochynok although the Supreme Court said the jury "did not provide this
infomiation in its verdict form."
The Supreme Court's decision states that the trial court should have made findings
regarding "the amount sought and won by each party". However, the trial court was not
in a position to do that for the very reasons stated several times in the Supreme Court
opinion. The jury properly conducted its deliberations outside the presence of the trial
court leaving no earmarked trail as to how it came to the award made to Pochynok.
The jury may have determined that Pochynok proved only part of Pochynok's
claims.

The jury may have determined the Smedsruds did not prove any of the

Smedsruds' counterclaims. The jury may have determined the Smedsruds proved part,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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but not all of their counterclaims and offset them against amounts it determined were
owed Pochynok.
The jury's single entry on the jury verdict form leaves the parties, their counsel,
the trial court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court to speculate and guess as to
whether and to what extent the jury may or may not have determined the Smedsruds were
entitled to offsets against a larger amount the jury determined was earned by Pochynok or
whether and the extent to which the jury decided the evidence was insufficient to support
certain claims.
A "flexible and reasoned" approach to the fee entitlement issue cannot arise from
speculation/supposition concerning the jury's verdict.

The Supreme Court's opinion

specifically rejects the "reasoned" suppositions made by the Court of Appeals concerning
suppositions previously made by the trial court, emphasizing that it cannot be determined
from the jury's verdict by what means the jury arrived at its result. The opinion of the
Supreme Court did not and could not help the trial court speculate as to how the jury may
or may not have proceeded in arriving at its award to Pochynok. There has been no
waiver of the right to jury trial as to foundational factual issues in favor of speculative
court findings of fact and conclusions of law made on a cold record three years after the
trial as to the meaning of a simple jury verdict.
While the opinion of the Supreme Court does not specifically direct a retrial, it
also does not and could not properly purport to deny the party's right to a jury trial on
factual issues the opinion states are dispositive of the attorney fee entitlement issue.
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The Supreme Court's opinion repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the trial court
could not make a determination of entitlement to attorney fees without additional
information. The Supreme Court's opinion repeatedly states such information is simply
not available from the jury verdict.

There is simply no source from which such

information can be derived other than from pure speculation. The trial court, therefore,
could not properly determine entitlement to attorney fees on the basis of its speculation
concerning the means by which a jury may have anived at the verdict in favor of
Pochynok.
If the jury had inserted a total entitlement figure in the Pochynok award and a total
entitlement figure in the blank provided for a Smedsrud award, would there be a starting
point for application of the "flexible and reasoned" and "balancing (claims and
recoveries) proportionally approach" directed by the Supreme Court?
No. Such figures would not alone suffice because as the Supreme Court's opinion
points out "the jury verdict does not specify who won what". Further, as stated by the
Supreme Court opinion:
It "gave no indication of whether, or by how much, the jury offset
the Smedsrud claim against Pochynok's claim". "[I]t is clear that the
nature of the flexible and reasoned approach outlined in Mountain States
and Wlripple requires more information about the jury award for the
parties' particular claims than is available in this case". "Such an analysis
in this case is impossible without more specific monetary figures".
"[Bjecause the jury's verdict did not indicate specific awards and offsets
the trial court did not have the information necessary to undertake such a
balancing". "[T]his insufficiency of information requires that we direct the
court of appeals to remand this case to the trial court for a determination of
awards and offsets..." (emphasis added)
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The final paragraph of the June 24, 2005 opinion of the Utah Supreme Court
directs the Court of Appeals "to remand to the trial court for a factual determination of
awards and offsets, followed by a ruling on who is the successful party under Utah Code
section 38-1-18(1) and whether an award of attorneys fees under Utah Code section 38-118(3) is proper."
To obtain the necessary information which the existing jury's verdict does not
supply, a new jury trial must be granted. A properly drafted special verdict form with
appropriate specific interrogatories must be submitted to the jury. Only in that way will a
factual basis exist for determining an award of attorney fees.
While counsel for the appellant could find little Utah case law which evaluates
facts similar to the case at hand, other jurisdictions have examined these issues. In
Kansas City Power & Light Companyv. Bibb & Assoiciates, Inc.,

S.W.3d

WL 1222691 (Mo.App. W.D.) the Missouri Court of Appeals stated:
In construing a verdict, the court determines if it can find a
reasonable clear intent expressed therein. Thome v. Thome, 350 S.W.2d
754, 757 (Mo.1961), overruled on other grounds by Douglass Safire, 712
S.W.2d 373 (Mo. banc 1986); Robinson v. Riverside Concrete, Inc., 544
S.W.2d 865, 871 (Mo.App. 1976). The verdict is construed liberally when
attempting to ascertain the jury's intent. Id.; Lewis v. State, 152 S.W.3d
325, 328 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) (quoting Morse v. Johnson, 594 S.W.2d
610, 616 (Mo. banc 1980)). To serve as the basis for the judgment, the
jury's verdict must be clear, intelligible, consistent, and certain. Robinson,
544 S.W.2d at 871. It should be responsible to all of the material issues.
Thome, 350 S.W.2d at 757. The verdict should impart a definite meaning
free from ambiguity and should show just what the jury intended.
Robinson, 544 S.W.2d at 871. "[T]he verdict must be clear and
unambiguous so that a judgment may be written upon it without resorting to
inference or construction." Lewis, 152 S.W.3d at 328 (quoting Morse, 594
S.W.2d at 616). The parties are entitled to the unconditional judgment of
the jury, rather than the court's interpretation of its findings. Robinson, 544
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S.W.2d at 871-872 (quoting Boone v. Richardson, 388 S.W.2d 68, 76
(Mo.App.1965), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. Sqfire, 712
S.W.2d 373 (Mo. banc 1986)). A court may not speculate as to what the
jury meant; and a verdict that requires speculation to determine its meaning
cannon stand and cannot support a judgment entered thereon. Id. at 872;
Trimble v. Pracna, 51 S.W.3d 481, 594 (Mo.App. S.D.2001).
In this case, the parties, the trial court and the appellate courts can only infer or
speculate how the jury reached its verdict. Thus, it is impossible from the jury verdict
form to determine on what claims, if any, the Smedsruds were successful. (As Pochynok
did in fact receive an award from the jury, it is undisputable it was successful on part of
its claims, however, the trial court did not take Pochynok's success at trial into account in
any manner in purportedly balancing the parties' relative successes at trial.)
Moreover, it is open to question whether and the extent to which the Smedsruds
were successful in regard to their unearned supervisory, work defect, and delay claims.
For example, it is possible the jury could have found Pochynok completed work and
enhanced the value of the Smedsruds' property in the amount of $50,000.00, thereby
entitling an award of that amount in Pochynok's favor. Additionally, the jury could have
also found that the Smedsuds incurred "delay" damages in the amount of $42,923.44,
thereby entitling the Smedruds to an award against Pochynok in that amount. The jury
could have netted these figures (rather than entering both figures on the jury verdict
form), and found in favor of Pochynok in the amount of $7,076.56.
The problem is, even if the record in this case contained the amounts sought by
both parties on their respective claims, it is impossible to know on what claims, and in
what amounts, the jury felt the parties were successful. In the above example, the jury
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could have concluded that Pochynok completed the work in a proper manner and was
entitled to be paid.

The jury could have also concluded that purported delays in

completing the work caused the Smedsruds' damage. Both parties would therefore be
entitled to recovery against the other.
This potential scenario (which based upon the lack of information from the jury is
as viable as any other scenario) raises an additional important issue. It is doubtful that
"delay damages" should in any way impact or "offset" the amount successfully asserted
in a mechanic's lien claim in any event. In Whipple, the Supreme Court stated:
We emphasize, however, that a court should look only to the parties'
claims and counterclaims relating directly to the specific mechanic's lien at
issue. Stated another way, wrhen assessing which party is the "successful
party" under the mechanic's lien statute, a court should confine itself to
consideration of only those claims relating directly to both the particular
property on which the mechanic's lien action is asserted and the particular
work on which the mechanic's lien action is based, (emphasis added)
Id. at 275.
From a common sense perspective, the lien claims are separate and distinct from
9

the delay damage claims, and provide different remedies. Logically, delay damages have
no direct relation to a mechanic's lien. Pursuant to Utah law, an appropriate mechanic's
lien is solely based on the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented.

Hence, if a contractor paints a room and thereby

increases the value of property by $1,000.00, the owner of that property has received
$1,000.00 in value, notwithstanding the fact that the room may not have been painted
within the timeframe expected by the parties.

The property owner may have been

damaged by a delay and entitled to recover an appropriate amount for the delay, but the
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delay in and of itself does not change the fact that the property owner did receive an
enhancement in value to his property of $1,000.00, which would be the correct
mechanic's lien amount.
Applying this reasoning to this case, even if the Smedsruds had paid Pochynok in
full for work completed on the project, the Smedsruds would have still been entitled to
sue Pochynok for any purported delay damages that were incurred in connection with the
project. If the Smedsruds were successful in the suit, however, it is unlikely (barring a
contractual provision) that the Smedsruds would receive their costs and fees as part of
their recovery. Notably, costs and fees are what is presently at issue in this matter.
In other words, the Smedsruds could be "successful" on a work delay claim
regardless of whether a mechanic's lien claim existed or not.

The point being, if

Pochynok Company established its lien claim for a certain amount, the fact that delay
damages are established by the Smedsruds should not negate the fact that Pochynok did
in fact establish the viability of its lien claim and its entitlement to statutory attorney fees
for establishing its claim. As such, it would be inappropriate for a court to simply net the
figures of a successful lien claim and a successful delay claim (two separate and distinct
claims), and then determine that a party was or was not successful for purposes of an
attorney fees award pursuant to the mechanic's lien statute based upon that net figure.
The trial court has also overlooked the fact that Pochynok was successful at trial
(as it received an award), but has not taken this into account in awarding costs and fees.
In effect, the trial court has granted the Smedsruds a clean win, granting all of their costs
and fees in spite the successes Pochynok did have at trial.
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This difficulty in this case is obvious. There is no way to know how the jury
reached its conclusions.

The parties and the courts can offer theories and rank

speculation on the matter, but there is no way to know. Without information from the
jury, the Supreme Court's mandated flexible and reasoned approach cannot properly be
applied in this case. The balancing camiot occur and there cannot be an appropriate
determination of awards and offsets. As such, for justice to occur, there must be a new
trial in this case.

Pochynok should also be awarded its costs and attorney fees in

prosecuting this appeal pursuant to § 38-1-18.
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SET ASIDE THE
GARNISHMENT OF POCHYNOK5 S ACCOUNT AND FAILED TO RESINSTATE
POCHYNOK5S MECHANIC'S LIEN?
The trial court erred when it failed to return the garnished funds to Pochynok and
reinstate it mechanic's lien following the Supreme Court's decision. The Utah Supreme
Court's decision caused the initial award of attorney's fees herein to be set aside. As
such, any and all amounts the Smedsruds obtained from the garnishment proceeding
founded on the trial court's award of attorney fees to the Smedsruds should have been
returned to Pochynok. This is so because after the attorney fee award was vacated, there
was no judgment amount which supported the Smedsmds retention of the garnished
funds. Additionally, Pochynok5s mechanic's lien on the Smedsruds' property should have
been reinstated.
While there do not appear to be any Utah decisions that relate directly to the issues
surrounding the return of garnished funds, other jurisdictions have evaluated similar
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situations. For example, in Baca v. Hoover, Bax, & Shearer, 823 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1992, writ denied), the court indicated that the validity of a
judgment in a garnishment action rests upon the finality of the underlying debt. The
court continued, "If the judgment in the main suit is reversed, the garnishment
proceedings become a nullity and the writs issued thereunder are functus officio, or of no
further force or authority." The Texas court then determined that because the summary
judgment had been reversed in that case, the garnishment proceeding became a nullity.
The Texas court concluded that the garnishees were entitled to restitution of the funds
that had been garnished from them.
Similar to the situation in Baca, in this case, the Utah Supreme Court has set aside
the award of attorney's fees, which entitled the Smedsmds to garnish funds from
Pochynok's account. As such, there was no legal basis for the Smedsmds to retain the
funds that were garnished until the time the trial court had entered its ruling.
Consequently, those funds should have been returned to Pochynok.
Additionally, the only net award remaining after the Supreme Court' and prior to
the trial court's revised ruling was in Pochynok's favor.

As such, Pochynok's

mechanic's lien against the Smedsmds' property should have been reinstated as well.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Pochynok respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the ruling of the trial court that the Smedsmds were the successful party herein on the
basis that the trial court did not have enough information to make a proper determination
of awards and offsets.

Moreover, Pochynok respectfully requests that this Court
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determine the trial court's failure to reinstate Pochynok's mechanic's lien and return
Pochynok's garnished funds was in error. Finally, Pochynok requests an award of its
costs and fees associated with this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 2

day of June, 2006.

Ray GrfMartineau
Anthony R. Martineaif
Brett D. Cragun
Attorneys For Plaintiff/Appellant
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Ross I. Romero
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m THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs.
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFTELD LUMBER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS,
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation;
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO
. GRANDE PAINTING,

SMEDSRUDS' PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW RE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS
FEES

Civil No. 020901328
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.

Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Louann Smedsrud by counsel and pursuant to this
Court's order of February 6, 2006, submits the following proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law re costs and attorneys fees in the above-entitled action.
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DATED this X l ^

day of February, 2006.
JONES, WALDO?/$OLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

Vincent C. Rampton
Ross I. Romero
Attorneys for Defendants and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs Gregory
Smedsrud and LouAiin Smedsrud
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
SMEDSRUDS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the
following this )^1 j ^ d a y of February, 2006:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684)
Ross I. Romero (USB #7771)
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Telephone: (801)521-3200

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER,
INC.; PELLA PRODUCTS, INC., a
corporation; BLAZE WHARTON
CONSTRUCTION, PNC, a corporation; DLXTE
WOODWORKS, INC., a corporation; and
JEFREY KAISER, dba RIO GRANDE
PAINTING,

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE COSTS
AND ATTORNEYS FEES

Civil No. 020901328
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Pursuant to directive of the Utah Supreme Court by Opinion dated June 24, 2005, the Court
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to its award of costs and
attorneys fees to Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") in the aboveentitled matter:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002.

2.

J. Pochynok Company Inc. ("Plaintiff') had filed a complaint against Gregory Smedsrud

and Lou Ann Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") to foreclose a mechanic's lien asserted for work allegedly
performed to the Smedsruds' residence located at 7100 Canyon Road in Summit County, State of Utah.
3.

Plaintiffs claims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's Lien filed with the Summit

County Recorder's office on October 19, 1999, in the amount of $74,360.51, together with interest, $100
in costs and attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1 hereto.
4.

Plaintiff had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of Mechanic's Lien against

Defendants' property on July 26, 1999 in the amount of $150,000, plus interest, costs and attorneys'
fees. See Exhibit 2.
5.

Plaintiff also brought claims against the Smedsruds for breach of contract and quantum

6.

The Smedsruds counterclaimed, asserting defective workmanship and failure to complete

meruit.

the project.
7.

Pella Products, Inc. had asserted a crossclaim against Smedsrud; this, however, had been

dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and prior order of this Court.
8.

hi addition, all claims of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against Defendants Blaze

Wharton Construction, Inc. and Jeffrey Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
Rule 41(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prior to trial.
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9.

At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of $81,269.9.1

(exclusive of costs and attorneys'fees).
10.

Plaintiff offered inconsistent calculations, however, for money allegedly owed in the

computation of its claim. Specifically, documentary evidence was introduced at trial showing
inconsistent demands by Plaintiff for payment.
11.

:

In addition, evidence was introduced that Plaintiff had filed the July 26, 1999 notice of

mechanics' lien against Smedsruds' residence at a time when significant draw requests had recently been
paid.
12.

Smedsruds presented evidence challenging Plaintiffs accounting work, and establishing

that Plaintiffs claim at trial, and its second notice of mechanics' lien, were excessive.
13.

Smedsruds also presented evidence that they were entitled to significant offsets for

unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Specifically, Smedsruds presented evidence that
a.

Paint work had been double charged, resulting in overcharge of $23,087.07;

b.

Plaintiffs contractor fee on the paint work overcharged was likewise unwarranted,

resulting in an overcharge of $2,308.71;
c.

Smedsruds had been subjected to unwarranted delay costs of $3,118.75; and

d.

Plaintiffs lien had been overstated, permitting offset in an amount equal to twice the

overcharge amount, which Smedsruds placed at $11,535.96.
14.

Smedsruds further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent

accounting from Plaintiff despite nearly tliree years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and
inconsistent claims coming from Plaintiff right up to the eve of trial. Had Plaintiff been willing to
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discuss a consistent claim in light of Defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have gone to
trial; absent a cogent accounting, though, Defendants had no choice but to submit the matter for a jury to
decide
15.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Plaintiff

in the amount of only $7,076.56.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

With respect to an award of costs and attorneys fees to the "successful party" in this

action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), this Court is charged with applying a "flexible and
reasoned approach" to the parties' relative successes in establishing their claims at trial -AK&R Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 2004 Utah 47,fflf25-26, 94 P.3d 270.
2.

At trial, Plaintiff asserted claims exceeding $81,000; Smedsruds, however (1) challenged

the propriety of Plaintiff s accounting and claim, and (2) asserted an offset claim of $40,050.49, together
with accrued judgment interest.
3.

As such, Plaintiff recovered on only a small fraction of its original claim, which was

reduced by a factor even greater than the dollar amount of Smedsruds' claimed offsets.
4.

The trial court found Smedsruds' challenge to Plaintiffs claim, coupled with their

asserted offsets, more persuasive than Plaintiffs offered evidence in support of its claim.
5.

The trial court was further persuaded that, had Plaintiff offered an accurate accounting to

Smedsruds, trial by jury might have been averted.
6.

Under these circumstances, the court concludes that Smedsruds obtained a comparative

victory, considering what total victory would have meant for each of the parties.
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7.

The court further concludes that Smedsruds obtained a full percentage of their claimed

8f

Accordingly, the court concludes that Smedsruds were the "successful party" at trial, for

offsets.

purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1).
9.

hi light of the foregoing, the court affirms its prior award of costs and attorneys fees to

Smedsruds, and its prior denial of costs and attomeys fees to Plaintiff.
10.

In light of the foregoing, the court likewise reaffirms its award of Smedsruds' costs and

attorneys fees incurred after May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3), given that
Smedsruds' May 9, 2002 Offer of Judgment was greater than Plaintiffs actual recovery at trial, with or
without an award of costs and attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1).
11.

The court therefore reaffirms its judgment upon verdict and order on post-trial motions

entered August 15, 2002, as that order and judgment may hereafter be supplemented in the amount of
any post-judgment costs and attorneys fees incurred by Smedsruds as may hereafter be established by
affidavit.
DATED this

day of March, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I liEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of February, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:

Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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MINUTE ENTRY
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUM3ER,
INC., a Corporation; PELLA
PRODUCTS, INC., a Corporation;
BLAZE WHARTON CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Corporation; DIXIE
WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation;
and JEFREY KAISER, doing
business as RIO GRANDE
PAINTING,

Case No. 020901328
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK
March 3, 2 00 6

Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs..

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Costs
and Attorneys Fees, submitted by the parties in accordance with
this Court's February 6, 2 006 Minute Entry and in response to the
Utah Supreme Court's concern regarding the need to enter
additional findings to support this Court's prior award of
attorney fees.
The Court having reviewed the respective submissions finds
those submitted by Defendants Gregory and Louann Smedsrud
accurately reflect the persuasive and credible evidence adduced
at trial. Accordingly, the Court will enter the same as the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Costs and Attorneys
Fees .
DATED this

J ^ d a y of March, 2 006. A
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specified.
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NAME
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